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The intense controversy sparked by the recent American 
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) recom-
mendations1 on genetic incidental findings is hardly surprising 
or unwarranted. The recommendations offer concrete propos-
als on a topic that has been debated in the context of research2,3 
but that has received inadequate attention in clinical medicine. 
They set out a bold, new vision of how to handle genetic infor-
mation. However, they have attracted a critical backlash, largely 
because they deny patients undergoing sequencing a choice 
as to whether or not to receive a minimum list of incidental 
findings. Moreover, the ACMG recommendations were pre-
sented, and have been widely perceived, as generating a con-
flict between the values of patient autonomy and beneficence. 
Naturally, any proposed sacrifice of patient autonomy merits 
serious debate.
The major criticism brought against the recommendations 
is that they unacceptably override patients’ consent, and hence 
their autonomy, which is the chief value protected by informed 
consent procedures. On this view, patients are wrongly denied 
the choice of an analysis confined to the “target” genes, and 
their “right not to know” is violated when they are informed by 
the clinician of any incidental findings. This departure from the 
established informed consent regime has been condemned as 
a disconcerting throwback to the era of medical paternalism.4
The ACMG working group sought to preempt these auton-
omy-based concerns by means of two arguments. First, that 
respecting patient preferences in the same manner as in tar-
geted testing is unduly burdensome in terms of the costs of 
genetic counseling and the need for laboratories to mask the 
informatics analysis of specific genes or to ignore findings of 
potential medical significance (p. 568). The second argument 
appeals to a fiduciary duty to benefit patients by providing 
them with medically actionable data of the kind contained in 
the minimum list. According to the ACMG report, the duty to 
prevent harm “supersedes concerns about autonomy” (p. 568).1
Setting aside the question of whether the ACMG recom-
mendations conform to established medical practice, we focus 
instead on the more fundamental ethical question of whether 
they are ultimately justifiable. In addressing this question, we 
wish to challenge an assumption that is apparently shared by 
both the ACMG working group and its critics, i.e., that the rec-
ommendations entail a conflict between a duty of beneficence 
toward patients, on the one hand, and respect for their auton-
omy, on the other. Challenging the assumption of a value con-
flict involves appreciating how the value of autonomy is shaped 
and constrained by considerations of psychological and institu-
tional realism and also by evaluative concerns.
To begin with the evaluative constraints: the value of auton-
omy concerns the ability to shape the contours of one’s life by 
making a choice from a menu of worthwhile options without 
undue interference from others.5 One does not enhance a per-
son’s autonomy by providing him or her with additional mor-
ally bad or worthless options. Of course, autonomy demands 
that whether or not the person takes up worthwhile options is a 
matter of their own free choice, but we can only speak of auton-
omy when such options are present. In this view, autonomy is 
not simply a matter of acting on one’s preferences, even one’s 
informed preferences. Therefore, proper regard for patients’ 
autonomy cannot be a straightforward matter of enabling them 
to fulfill their preferences or their subjective “values.”6 For 
example, there is no sound autonomy-based argument requir-
ing people to receive medical treatment tailored to preferences 
that reflect immoral (e.g., racist) or unreasonable (e.g., astro-
logical) beliefs. This is because fashioning health-care options 
in this way would not contribute to their value.
If, however, autonomy involves choice from a range of worth-
while options, we must ask what value there is in patients being 
able to choose not to have incidental findings investigated 
and disclosed when undergoing sequencing. The mere exis-
tence of a preference to this effect is insufficient to generate an 
autonomy-based argument to provide such an option. In our 
view, critics of the proposals have not done nearly enough to 
show why such an option is valuable, let alone that its value 
to patients generates a right to that option. Indeed, it is argu-
able that the  proposed ACMG regime for incidental findings 
actually enhances patient autonomy. It does this by generating 
a fuller menu of worthwhile options from which patients can 
make life-shaping (including life-saving) choices. The short 
list of conditions that must be investigated under the recom-
mendations has been drawn up according to criteria—such 
as disease seriousness, high probability of onset, and medi-
cal actionability— that will reliably generate valuable options. 
These options are principally valuable in enabling the pursuit of 
improved health outcomes for the patients themselves. But they 
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are also valuable insofar as they benefit the patient’s relatives 
and serve the common good of promoting a healthy society.
Does this defense of the recommendations extend to the case 
of children? Is the child’s future autonomy sacrificed by the 
unavailability to them or their parents of an option to undergo 
purely targeted testing? The onset of the overwhelming major-
ity of conditions on the ACMG list can occur in childhood. 
Therefore, findings regarding these conditions (e.g., mutation 
at the Von Hippel–Lindau locus associated with Von Hippel–
Lindau syndrome) are potentially crucial in enhancing medical 
options during childhood and adolescence.7 Decision making 
about minors’ medical care is strongly influenced by the beliefs, 
values, and abilities of their parents, their clinicians, and gradu-
ally of minors themselves as their decision-making capacities 
evolve. Acting in a child’s best interest, which centrally includes 
enabling them to mature into an autonomous agent, requires 
the availability of worthwhile options. Creating such options is 
hardly an affront to their future autonomy.
What about the remaining conditions on the ACMG list 
whose onset occurs in adulthood? Although this is a complex 
issue that we do not purport to resolve here, we nonetheless 
believe that again no violation of the child’s autonomy need 
occur. Some of the most valuable options in people’s lives 
involve deep personal relationships with others, especially 
family members. Therefore, the autonomy of the child can be 
served precisely through serving the well-being and autonomy 
of these other people. Hence, if genetic incidental findings 
relating to adult-onset conditions can have a bearing on the 
health of parents and siblings of children, their disclosure may 
be plausibly viewed as enhancing the autonomy of the child. 
Of course, in a fuller treatment, this line of argument would 
need to be nuanced in various ways. But consider the incongru-
ity of telling a bereaved child that information that could have 
saved his or her mother’s life was not sought out of respect for 
the child’s own autonomy. With adequate counseling and other 
safeguards in place, it is far from obvious that a due respect for 
autonomy requires us to countenance such a tragic outcome.
We turn now to the need for psychological and institutional 
realism in understanding autonomy. The ACMG recom-
mendations have attracted severe criticism for noncompli-
ance with standard informed consent procedures. However, 
imposing such procedures in this context arguably involves 
unrealistic assumptions about both the capacity of patients to 
grasp such information and their ability to use it in arriving 
at reasoned decisions.8 It also makes implausible assumptions 
about the capacities of institutions to provide comprehensive 
and  accurate information, especially given the rapid pace of 
developments in genetics (a consideration registered in the 
ACMG working group’s first argument mentioned above). It is 
important to note that calls to adapt our demands on informed 
 consent to a realistic assessment of the capabilities of individual 
agents and institutions have already emerged in the related con-
text of genetic research.9,10 The question of whether standard 
informed consent procedures are effective in serving the value 
of autonomy is, however, more generally pertinent in medical 
genetics practice. Some of the proposals generated in relation 
to the research context offer alternative paradigms for handling 
genetic data, such as the stewardship model and the creation of 
trustworthy institutions. In none of these proposals is the value 
of consent denied, but it is not made to operate as autonomy’s 
sole line of defense.
The ACMG recommendations are in tune with these broader 
developments reflecting the limitations of informed consent 
regimens. Under the recommendations, patients’ consent fig-
ures at two crucial points: they have a choice of whether to 
undergo clinical sequencing at all, and they have a choice of 
whether to follow up on any incidental findings by undergoing 
medical treatment. However, as a matter of the practical work-
ability of the proposals, we believe that it may also be advisable 
for patient choice to be introduced at an intermediate stage. 
The proposals contemplate that the clinician “contextualize any 
incidental findings for the patient in light of personal and fam-
ily history, physical examination, and other relevant findings”1 
(p. 567) in the course of a clinician–patient interaction that 
involves dialogue about the best way forward for the patient. 
Given the widespread sensitivity in society about genetic data, 
one manifested not only in lay people’s attitudes but also in 
laws and other official pronouncements, the effectiveness of the 
scheme might be enhanced by an amendment. Clinicians, in 
the process of shared decision making, should also standardly 
offer patients the opportunity to opt out of receiving the details 
of the incidental findings generated in their case, as opposed to 
being informed of the general fact that such findings exist. It 
is worth noting, this opt-out stems not from the patient’s sup-
posed “right not to know” but from a pragmatic acknowledg-
ment of the fact that the effective operation of the scheme may 
depend on making this concession to patient choice.
As genetics increasingly comes to pervade medicine, it is 
important to foster the trustworthiness of the mechanisms 
through which it finds clinical application. It is an illusion to 
suppose that such trust can exclusively be achieved through 
discrete acts of informed consent by patients, a sort of super-
market model according to which I have consented to pay for 
each item in my basket by putting it there. For trust to be well-
placed about the items on offer, they must be of sufficient qual-
ity to be on the market, and an accountable regulatory system is 
necessary to ensure that this is the case.
We have argued against presenting the ACMG’s recommen-
dations as sacrificing patient autonomy to beneficence, even if 
this sacrifice is treated as ultimately justified. This is not only 
questionable as a matter of moral reasoning, but it also need-
lessly fuels anxieties about autonomy and trust, as the pre-
dictable critical response to the recommendations has vividly 
demonstrated. On the reframing of the debate advanced here, 
the recommendations should be defended as measures that 
enhance both autonomy and trust in the context of genetic 
medicine.
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